Manager characteristics and manager-replacement: How is pension fund performance affected? by Alda, M.
 Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 66, 2016, no. 2                                        161 
JEL classification: G12, G14, G23 
Keywords: abnormal return, event-study methodology, manager characteristics, manager replacement, 
pension funds, performance 
Manager Characteristics and Manager-Replacement:  
How Is Pension Fund Performance Affected? 
Mercedes ALDA—Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Zaragoza, Zaragoza, Spain 
(malda@unizar.es) 
Abstract 
Pension funds are professionally managed investment products designed to cover 
the retirement needs of individual investors, so managerial control mechanisms are cru-
cial to future retirement income. In this paper, we analyze the effectiveness of the manager 
replacement mechanism in pension funds. We first examine possible determinants (raw 
return, excess return, risk and manager and fund characteristics) of manager replace-
ment in a sample of Spanish pension funds. We also analyze the impact of manager 
replacement on funds’ returns (raw and excess returns) and risk via an analysis 
of manager characteristics. Finally, we employ an event-study methodology to examine 
the capacity of new managers to generate positive abnormal returns. Our empirical 
results show that manager replacement is not motivated only by poor excess returns, 
but is also linked to manager characteristics. Pension funds with good performance 
in the pre-replacement period suffer deterioration after replacement, and new managers 
need about one year to achieve good results. In funds without replacement, managers 
with longer tenure underperform and female managers are market-risk averse. 
1. Introduction 
In recent decades, an ageing population and increasing doubts concerning 
pay-as-you-go public pension systems have enhanced investment in pension funds, 
bringing the total global investment to more than USD 36 trillion in 2014 (Towers 
Watson, 2015). Pension funds are professionally managed, generally in accordance 
with accepted risk-return portfolio management principles (Markowitz, 1952; Sharpe, 
1964; Lintner, 1965; Black, 1972), though the actions of managers also have a sub-
stantial impact on performance. Consequently, the pension fund industry has estab-
lished control mechanisms, such as manager replacement, in order to minimize poor 
results.  
In this paper, we analyze the manager-replacement mechanism in a sample 
of Spanish pension funds, examining its determinants with a multivariate logit approach, 
its consequences for raw returns, excess returns (performance) and risk, and its effec-
tiveness, measuring the existence of significant abnormal returns through an event-
study methodology.  
The manager-replacement determinants and effectiveness are not clear in prior 
works. There exists a body of financial literature that deals with the relation between 
manager replacement and performance in mutual funds. A number of studies find 
improvements after replacement of poorly performing managers and performance 
deterioration after replacement of outperforming managers in mutual funds (Denis 
and Denis, 1995; Khorana, 1996; Khorana, 2001; Clare et al., 2014; Andreu et al., 
2015).  
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Several mutual fund studies find that manager replacement is performance-
sensitive to manager characteristics, such as tenure, age, gender and management 
structures. Chevalier and Ellison (1999a, 1999b) find that younger managers achieve 
better performance, but these managers are more likely to be replaced when the fund 
risk deviates from the industry norm. Ding and Wermers (2012) find that managers 
with longer tenure outperform in large funds, but underperform in small funds. 
On the other hand, Porter and Trifts (1998) suggest that experienced managers become 
complacent, leading to a negative effect on performance. Kempf et al. (2014) point 
out that managers with longer tenure may have a different standing within the organi-
zation, influencing both investment behavior and performance. Therefore, we expect 
that manager tenure will influence manager replacement, depending on a given 
manager’s excess returns.  
Although the influence of the manager’s gender has not been studied in manager-
replacement processes, it is another factor that influences investment behavior and, as 
a consequence, is a possible cause of manager replacement. Hinz et al. (1997), Dwyer 
et al. (2002) and Watson and Robinson (2003) find gender differences in investing 
attitudes and in risk behavior, suggesting a lower propensity for risk-taking among 
females. Studying the Australian superannuation fund, Watson and McNaughton 
(2007) indicate that women choose more conservative investment strategies. Powell 
and Ansic (1997) find that males and females adopt different strategies, but gender 
has no significant impact on the ability to perform. Niessen-Ruenzi and Ruenzi (2015) 
find no gender differentials in performance, but mutual funds managed by females 
receive lower inflows.  
Another manager-replacement decision consists in changing the management 
structure (team versus individual manager). Teams present greater comprehension 
of information and more effective feedback in decision-making (Bikhchandani et al., 
1998; Kaufman, 1999). Conversely, Prather and Middleton (2002) find no percep-
tible difference between the outcomes of team-managed and individually managed 
funds. Prather and Middleton (2006) also find no differences between teams and 
individuals in market-timing and security-selection decisions. Additionally, Massa 
et al. (2010) find that mutual funds with named managers have greater inflows and 
suffer less return diversion; however, the departure of these named managers reduces 
net flows. Bär et al. (2011) find, in US equity mutual funds, that teams take less 
extreme decisions and are less likely to achieve extreme performance. In the case 
of pension funds, we expect that a specific structure will lead to manager replace-
ment if it is thought to generate higher excess returns.  
Empirical evidence on pension funds is scarce, but the existing manage- 
ment differences between mutual funds and pension funds (Del Guercio and Tkac,  
2002; Sialm et al., 2015) suggests that this mechanism can cause different manager-
replacement behavior. Goyal and Wahal (2008) find that US plan sponsors hire fund-
management firms after large positive excess returns, but these firms do not deliver 
positive excess returns thereafter. Moreover, the results also indicate that managers 
are terminated for a number of reasons not necessarily limited to underperformance. 
Unlike Goyal and Wahal (2008), in our work we study pension funds that are 
managed internally, which is a common characteristic of Spanish pension funds.  
The limited evidence on this topic for pension funds and the lack of studies 
outside the US market lend support for our analysis of the Spanish pension fund 
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industry. The Spanish pension fund industry offers interesting opportunities to study 
this particular issue. Despite the late appearance of pension funds, in 1988, the indus-
try has experienced outstanding growth in recent decades, amounting to more than 
EUR 100 billion in assets under management by September 2015.
1
 Moreover, our 
sample covers a period of fund mergers resulting from the recent reorganization 
of the Spanish financial sector, which provides us with useful data on changes 
in fund management. 
We first study the determinants of pension fund manager replacement. We 
consider as determinants the raw return, excess return, risk, manager characteristics 
and fund characteristics. Raw returns can be a reason for replacement, since investors 
observe it directly, but replacement decisions do not primarily lie with individual 
investors, so we also include excess returns, which reflects real manager performance 
and may be the primary reason for manager replacement. Our main finding is that 
manager replacement in Spanish pension funds is not motivated solely by poor 
excess returns. Manager characteristics and risk positions are also causes of manager 
replacement. 
The second contribution of this paper is an analysis of the role of manager 
characteristics in raw returns, excess returns and risk in pension funds, with and 
without manager replacement. Our results show that managers with longer tenure 
underperform when funds do not replace those managers, managerial structure and 
manager gender do not influence the excess return, and female managers are sys-
tematically risk-averse and support more idiosyncratic risk.  
Finally, we analyze the capacity of new managers to improve fund perfor-
mance by measuring abnormal returns with an event-study methodology. We find 
that outperformers in the pre-replacement period suffer deterioration and new managers 
need one year to adapt and obtain positive abnormal returns.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, we describe 
the data used. Section 3 presents our methodology. Section 4 contains our empirical 
results, and Section 5 concludes the paper. 
2. Data and Sample Description 
We analyze the Spanish pension fund industry because it has experienced 
considerable development since its inception in 1988 and now is the eighth largest 
pension fund industry in the EU25 (OECD, 2014), with more than EUR 100 billion 
in assets under management.
2
 Our particular focus is on pension funds investing 
in European equities, because those comprise the main equity category (over 58% 
of equity pension funds) and represent an active segment in the European pension 
fund industry. Additionally, their management is especially affected by stock market 
fluctuations, which makes the managers more prone to experiencing replacement. 
Finally, Spanish pension funds are typically internally managed, which facilitates 
a study of manager replacement, as sponsors select their own managers. Specifically, 
pension funds are promoted by three types of entities: credit institutions (mainly banks), 
insurance companies and companies specializing in management and financial ad-
1 Data obtained from the Spanish Association of Investment and Pension Funds (INVERCO), www.inverco.es. 
2 Data obtained from INVERCO, September 2015: www.inverco.es 
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vice, so the pension funds of these entities are managed by their own management 
groups. 
Our database was obtained from Morningstar and comprises all monthly 
returns and total net assets (TNA ) of Spanish pension funds investing in European 
equities from January 1999 to August 2014.
3
 Additional data fields are fund name, 
fund family, fund inception date and certain manager information (manager name 
or team name, start and end dates of each manger’s tenure). We require at least 
24 months of data for each pension fund to ensure the consistency of the analysis, so 
the sample is restricted to 98 pension funds in all. The total net assets of these 
98 funds are more than EUR 3.3 billion, comprising 57% of Spanish equity pension 
funds. 
We use the manager data to create three manager-characteristic variables. 
First, we compile a manager tenure variable (in years), considering the start and end 
dates of each manager’s tenure. We also construct a team dummy variable, taking 
into account manager changes over time and the fact that some funds are inter-
mittently managed by teams. The team dummy takes the value of 1 for the period 
in which a pension fund is managed by a team and 0 when managed by an individual. 
Finally, we build a gender dummy variable (Gender) that takes the value of 1 if 
the manager is female or 0 otherwise. All these variables take management replace-
ment into account, which is to say that the dummy variables are time-variant. 
To compute the risk-adjusted excess returns, and given the location of the pen-
sion funds studied, the risk-free asset, market, size, book-to-market and momentum 
factors are the European factors developed by Fama and French,
4
 who build homo-
genous factors for different countries and regions, according to the Fama and French 
(1993) and Carhart (1997) models. 
Table 1 reports certain descriptive statistics of the data. Panel A shows statis-
tics for all pension funds (raw return, TNA, flows, manager tenure, CAPM and four-
factor alphas) and risk factors (market excess return, size, book-to-market and 
momentum) from January 1999 to August 2014. The average raw return is positive 
(0.002), but the excess returns (alphas) are negative (-0.0035 and -0.0017). More-
over, managers stay, on average, more than five years with a fund.  
Panel B shows the number of funds with manager replacement by year. We 
observe that replacements are not evenly distributed over the years, beginning 
in 2006 (ten replacements). The lack of replacements before 2006 may due to the fact 
that the average inception date of these pension funds is October 2001 and more 
than 17% of the funds first appear in 2004 and 2005, so this seems to indicate that 
younger funds usually have fewer resources to replace managers during the initial 
years of their existence. On the other hand, the largest number of manager replace-
ments is found in 2012 (31), which could be related to the climax of the restructuring 
process of many financial groups in Spain since 2010–2011. During this process, 
the structure of many financial institutions has changed due to mergers, acquisitions 
 
3 We should clarify that Spanish equity pension funds must invest at least 75% of their assets in stocks 
(according to INVERCO). The pension funds studied present 80% to 100% of the investment in European 
equity securities (given the European investment location of the pension funds studied), and our study is 
focused on the equity part. 
4 Data available on the website of Fama and French: 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html#Developed 
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Table 1  Summary Statistics 
Table 1 is divided into four panels. Panel A shows descriptive statistics (mean, standard devia-
tion, minimum and maximum) of the 98 pension funds analyzed: monthly raw return, monthly total 
net assets (TNA) in EUR million, monthly fund flows (defined as Fit = [TNAit – TNAit-1*(1+Rit)]/ 
/TNAit-1), which are winsorized by fund at the bottom and top 1% level of the distribution, manager 
tenure in years, CAPM alpha, four-factor alpha, and risk factors (market excess return [rm], size 
[SMB], book-to-market [HML], and momentum [MOM]) from January 1999 to August 2014. Panel B 
lists the number of pension funds that experienced manager replacement annually from 1999 to 
2014. Panel C shows the number of funds, the average fund raw return [TNA], manager tenure, 
flows, CAPM alpha and four-factor alpha of the funds that did not experience manager replace-
ment and the funds that did. Panel D shows the number and percentage of funds managed by 
a team or a single manager, a female or a male, an all-female/all-male team, or a team with some 
female members. Panels E and F show the raw return and excess returns (CAPM and four-
factor alphas) of the funds with manager replacement (before and after), taking into account 
the funds’ management structure before and after manager replacement. 
Panel A  Descriptive statistics of pension funds and risk factors 
 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Fund return 0.002 0.047 -0.234 0.236 
TNA 2.34*107 4.61*107 29.0 5.78*108 
Flows 0.053 1.509 -0.949 100.422 
Manager tenure 5.298 4.145 0 16.881 
CAPM alpha -0.0035 0.0019 -0.0092 0.0034 
4-factor alpha -0.0017 0.0016 -0.0088 0.0046 
rm 0.005 0.055 -0.221 0.138 
SMB 0.002 0.023 -0.069 0.093 
HML 0.005 0.028 -0.096 0.11 
MOM 0.009 0.048 -0.26 0.138 
Panel B  Number of funds with manager-replacement per year 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 2 3 2 1 5 31 7 2 
Panel C  Statistics of pension funds without and with manager-replacement 
 
No-manager-replacement funds Manager-replacement(s) funds 
Number of funds 50 48(15) 
Fund return 0.001 0.002 
TNA 1.93*107 2.36*107 
Manager tenure 
Flows 0.063 0.056 
CAPM alpha -0.0037 -0.0030 
4-factor alpha -0.0016 -0.0016 
Panel D  Manager characteristics: Team and gender 
 
No. of funds Percentage of funds (calculated on 98 funds) 
Team / single managers 33 / 65 33.67% / 66.33% 
Female / male managers 11 / 87 11.22% / 88.78% 
Team of women / men 1 / 32 1.02% / 32.65% 
Woman in a team 7 7.14% 
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Panel E  Raw return considering fund structure  
               (team or single manager) before and after manager-replacement 
Structure Before After 
Percentage of funds  
(on 98 funds) 
Change of a team by a single manager 0.0002 0.0096 2.04% 
Change of a single manager by a team -0.0016 0.0073 7.14% 
Change of a team by another team 0.0016 0.0057 8.16% 
Change of a single manager by another manager 0.0013 0.0069 52.04% 
Panel F  CAPM and four-factor alphas considering fund structure  
               before and after manager-replacement 
 
CAPM alpha Four-factor alpha 
Structure Before After Before After 
Change of a team by a single manager -0.0014 -0.0036 -0.0008 -0.0016 
Change of a single manager by a team -0.0034 -0.0037 -0.0018 -0.0019 
Change of a team by another team -0.0039 -0.0016 -0.0020 -0.0011 
Change of a single manager  
by another manager 
-0.0035 -0.0035 -0.0020 -0.0015 
 
and the transformation of savings banks into commercial banks. As a result, financial 
institutions have been forced to implement changes in the organization and mana-
gement of their pension funds. Specifically, in our sample, 48% and 15% of the manager 
replacements in 2012 correspond to pension funds managed by La Caixa and Caser, 
respectively. La Caixa was a Spanish savings bank that underwent a privatization 
process starting in 2011, thus becoming a banking foundation. On the other hand, 
Caser is an insurance company that has lost some agreements with commercial banks 
and savings banks due to the restructuring process (many entities prefer to offer their 
own pension funds). These figures show that Caser is making management changes 
in an attempt to attract more contracts. Furthermore, we observe that manager replace-
ment in Spanish pension funds is related to financial restructuring; indeed, replace-
ments in our sample begin to increase in 2011 (five) and continue in 2013 (seven), 
though at a lower frequency. 
Panel C shows statistics of pension funds with and without manager replace-
ment. Our sample contains 50 pension funds that did not change managers over 
the period studied and 48 pension funds that replaced managers. Among the latter, 
fifteen funds replaced their managers twice. The average return
5 
and size of the funds 
that experienced manager replacement are higher than the average return and size 
of the funds without manager replacement, though the tenures of their manager are 
shorter and their flows are lower. The excess return (CAPM and four-factor alphas) 
is negative before and after replacement, though less negative in funds with manager 
replacement. 
Panel D shows that 33 (65) funds are managed by a team (single manager), 
11 (87) by a female (male) and, among the team-managed funds (33), only one is 
managed by a team of women, while seven team-managed funds have at least one 
female member. 
5 We consider the average fund return during the period studied (or existence of the fund) for the funds 
with and without manager replacement. 
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Panels E and F display a preliminary analysis aimed at studying the relation 
between returns (raw and excess returns) and the fund management structure (team or 
single manager) in the funds with manager replacement.Panel E shows that the raw 
return improves after replacement, independently of the given fund’s management 
structure (teams replaced by single managers, single managers replaced by teams, 
one team replaced by another, or a single manager replaced by another). Pension 
funds tend to adopt the same structure after a change (8.16% and 52.04% are funds 
managed by a team and single manager for the whole period analyzed, respectively), 
and management by a team is the structure selected to replace single managers when 
the prior raw return is negative; however, the replacement of a team by a single 
manager is not clearly linked to the raw return. Additionally, the average raw return 
of the funds without replacement (not reported) is 0.166% in funds with a single 
manager and 0.134% in team-managed funds. This evidence shows that having 
a single manager is the most common structure, presenting a higher raw return, but 
management changes are also more frequent in funds with a single manager. With 
regard to the excess return, panel F shows general a negative excess return, which 
decreases when the fund management structure changes (from a team to a single 
manager or vice versa) and improves when the fund management structure is 
the same after the manager-replacement. 
Additional summary statistics of the return and risk measures for all funds and 
funds with and without manager replacement are available upon request. The raw 
return is positive (0.15%) on average, but this sample is characterized by negative 
values, since the median is higher (0.69%). The raw return of funds with manager 
replacement is higher than the raw return of those without manager replacement 
(0.16% versus 0.14%); however, this difference is not significant. All funds present 
a negative excess return (CAPM and four-factor alphas), which is lower in funds 
without manager replacement, indicating negative performance. On the other hand, 
funds with manager replacement take less risk (market, idiosyncratic and total risk), 
though the market risk and four-factor idiosyncratic risk differences between funds, 
with and without manager replacement, are not significant.  
3. Method 
3.1 Determinants of Manager Replacement 
The related literature on manager behavior demonstrates that manager 
characteristics and fund characteristics can produce differential excess returns. 
In order to study whether certain fund features and manager characteristics are 
determinants of manager-replacement decisions, in this section we present a multi-
variate approach with logit estimation, regressing a binary manager-replacement 
variable on several explanatory variables and controls. Additionally, the proposed 
model tests the hypothesis that manager tenure and management structure are causes 
of manager replacement only if they generate lower excess return. Model (1) speci-
fies a multinomial logistic regression considering different fund features and manager 
characteristics and whether the excess return obtained by teams and managers with 
different degrees of experience are determinants of manager replacement.  
     
* *
* * *
; ; ; ; ; 1 ; 2 ;
3 ; 4 ; 5 ; ;
it it it it it it it it it it
it
it it it it it it it it
R Risk Team Gender Tenureq Tenureq
D f
Tenureq Tenureq Tenureq TNA Flows
α α α α
α α α
∗ 
=  
 
      (1) 
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where Dit is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when a fund experiences 
manager replacement or 0 otherwise. The explanatory variables are pension fund raw 
return (Rit), excess return (αit), which is measured as the alpha of Jensen (1968) or 
the four-factor model alpha (Carhart, 1997), and fund risk (Riskit), measured as 
the total risk or the market and idiosyncratic fund risk. Team and Gender
6
 are dummy 
variables that take the value of 1 when the fund is managed by a team or a female, or 
0 otherwise. Tenureq1, Tenureq2, Tenureq3, Tenureq4 and Tenureq5 are dummy 
variables that equal 1 when manager tenure is in the first (lowest experience), second, 
third, fourth or fifth quintile (highest experience), respectively. The sensitivity 
of manager replacement to excess return for team-managed funds is based on the com-
bination of αit and αit * Team variables. The sensitivity of manager replacement to 
the excess return of managers with different levels of experience is determined by αit 
and αit * Tenurequintile variables. As control variables, we include fund size and 
flows. Fund size is expressed as the logarithm of the total net assets. Flows
7
 are the per-
centage money flows and are defined as the monthly change in TNA net of fund 
returns during month t: ( )( )1 11 /itit it it itF TNA TNA R TNA∗− −= − + . We hypothesize that 
size and flows could be important determinants of manager replacement, since larger 
funds have more resources to replace managers when they need to do so and flow 
decreases may be a justification for manager replacement. 
3.2 Raw Return, Excess Return and Manager Characteristics 
We analyze the role of certain manager characteristics (tenure, managerial 
structure and gender) on raw return and excess return, taking into account whether or 
not a fund has experienced manager replacement. The model applied is as follows: 
                               ( ); ; ; ;it it it it it itD f Tenure Team Gender TNA Flows=                       (2) 
where Dit is the dependent variable, i.e. the raw return (Rit) or excess return (αit) 
measured as the Jensen’s alpha or the four-factor model. Tenure is the logarithm 
of the years that a manager/team has worked with a fund. Team and Gender are 
dummy variables that take the value of 1 when the fund is managed by a team or 
a female, or 0 otherwise. The fund size (logarithm of TNA) and flows 
                                 ( )( )1 11 /itit it it itF TNA TNA R TNA∗− − = − +    
are control variables. In this case, we would expect that larger funds and funds 
experiencing inflows could achieve higher returns because more resources can 
generate scale economies. 
3.3 Risk and Manager Characteristics 
In this section, we examine whether the relation between manager charac-
teristics and risk varies, taking into account manager replacement. Prior works, such 
as Chevalier and Ellison (1999a), explain that managers with different characteristics 
take different risk positions; specifically, managers with longer tenure choose lower 
6 We also thought to include a female team dummy variable in order to distinguish funds managed by 
an all-female team; however, our sample only contains one fund with this characteristic. 
7 To ensure that extreme values do not drive our results, flows are winsorized by fund at the bottom and 
top 1% level of the distribution. 
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systematic risk positions. Similarly, Hinz et al. (1997), Watson and Robinson (2003) 
and Watson and McNaughton (2007) show that women choose more conservative 
investment strategies.  
We measure risk through analysis of the total, systematic and idiosyncratic 
risks. The total risk is measured as the standard deviation of fund returns (Rit); 
the systematic risk is obtained from the one-factor model (CAPM) and the four-
factor Carhart model. The idiosyncratic risk is obtained from the one- and four-factor 
models as follows: 
                                                   
it it itR it mε
σ σ β σ= −                                                  (3) 
Where 
itε
σ is the idiosyncratic risk, 
itR
σ is the pension fund risk, itβ is the market beta 
of the one- or four-factor model, and 
itm
σ is the standard deviation of the market 
return. 
The model proposed for analyzing risk and manager characteristics is as 
follows: 
                       ( ); ; ; ;it it it it it itRisk f Tenure Team Gender TNA Flows=                      (4) 
where Riskit represents the different risk measures, specifically the total risk (σit), 
the systematic risk (βit) and the idiosyncratic risk ( )itεσ . Size and flows are included 
as control variables because we expect that larger funds have less systematic risk and 
are able to diversify more efficiently (lower idiosyncratic risk); however, higher flows 
may lead to a need for more frequent rebalancing, which makes it more difficult to 
control the risk level. 
3.4 An Event Study:  
The Abnormal Returns of Funds with Manager Replacement 
In order to analyze the significance (effectiveness) of manager-replacement 
with respect to returns, we apply an event-study approach that shows whether the excess 
return achieved in a window period around the manager-replacement date is signifi-
cantly positive or negative (Clare et al., 2014).  
In our case, the event is a manager replacement and the event date (t) is 
the manager-replacement date, and we check the abnormal return before, during and 
after a window period around the event. First, we test the significance of the excess 
return some time before the event because if managers know that they are going to be 
replaced, they may act differently (Clare et al., 2014; Andreu et al., 2015). Moreover, 
we test the immediate effect of manager replacement by analyzing the excess return 
obtained some time after the replacement. Finally, we evaluate whether the manager-
replacement process has repercussions on the excess return during the whole process 
(some time before and after the manager-replacement date), i.e. during the window 
period.  
4. Results 
In this section, we first analyze the determinants of manager replacement. We 
then study how manager characteristics influence the raw return, excess return and 
risk, depending on the existence of manager replacement. Finally, we examine 
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the impact of manager replacement by measuring the abnormal return in different 
event windows. 
4.1 Determinants of Manager Replacement 
First, we examined the likelihood of the occurrence of manager replacement 
depending on several fund features and manager characteristics (expression 1).  
Table 2 shows that the raw return is not a determinant of manager replace-
ment. Models (1) and (2) show that funds with lower excess returns have a higher 
probability of manager replacement, but the excess return is not significant in models (3) 
and (4). Market-risk coefficients show that managers with lower market risk are more 
likely to be replaced, suggesting that tenure and fund structure can also be related to 
market risk. The idiosyncratic and total risk coefficients are not significant. Male 
managers have a greater probability of being replaced. With regard to the variables 
linked to the excess return, teams are less likely to be replaced when the excess 
return is higher. Managers with short (first quintile) tenures are more likely to be 
replaced when they obtain higher returns. This may be due to voluntary departure, 
since good managers tend to look for better positions in other funds, usually hedge 
funds (Kostovetsky, 2010). On the other hand, managers with more experience 
(second, third, fourth and fifth quintiles) are more likely to be replaced when the excess 
return decreases. Additionally, larger funds tend to replace their managers more 
frequently and fund flow is not a significant variable. These results confirm our 
hypothesis, proving that the team and experience variables are linked to the excess 
return. 
4.2 Raw Return, Excess Return and Manager Characteristics 
In this section, we evaluate the influence of manager characteristics on the raw 
and excess returns (CAPM and Carhart alphas). Table 3 shows these results, taking 
into account all pension funds, those funds that do not experience manager replace-
ment and, among those funds that do, the influence before and after the change.  
With regard to raw returns, Table 3 shows that tenure is positively related to 
raw returns. Raw returns increase when managers are more experienced, despite 
the existence (or not) of manager replacement. Managerial structure and gender
8
 do 
not affect returns. The fund size coefficient is not significant and returns increase 
when funds receive more flows. 
The relation between the excess return (CAPM and Carhart alphas) and manager 
characteristics shows different results with the existence of manager replacement. 
Analyzing all funds, we find significant results only when using the CAPM alpha 
(column 3). Tenure and excess return present an inverse relation, despite the fact that 
more experienced managers achieve higher raw returns (column 2), so the execution 
of these managers is worse and generates lower excess returns. Funds managed by 
a female display lower performance and inflows affect the excess return positively. 
The team variable and fund size do not affect the excess return. 
8 We include the gender variable in this model because we believe that female managers may present 
a different level of risk aversion; however, the absence of significance may be due to the limited number 
of observations with this characteristic. We repeat this analysis with the gender variable removed and 
the results remain the same (these results are available upon request; they are not reported here due to 
space constraints). 
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Table 2  The Importance of the Excess Returns of Teams and Managers  
with Different Experience Levels in Determining Manager Replacement 
Table 2 shows the results of a multinomial logit specification to examine the fund characteristics 
and manager characteristics that induce manager replacement (expression 1). The manager 
replacement indicator variable equals 1 if a fund experiences manager replacement. Ri is the fund’s 
raw return, αit is the alpha from the CAPM model in (1) and (2) or from the four-factor model 
in (3) and (4). βm,it and σεi are the market beta and idiosyncratic risk from the CAPM model in (1) 
or from the four-factor model in (3). σi is the total risk. Team is a dummy variable that equals 1 if 
the fund is managed by a team or 0 otherwise. Gender is a dummy that equals 1 if the manager 
is a female or 0 otherwise. Tenureq1, Tenureq2, Tenureq3, Tenureq4 and Tenureq5 are dummy 
variables that equal 1 when the manager’s tenure is in the first, second, third, fourth or fifth 
quintile, respectively. The first quintile shows the shortest tenure and the fifth quintile represents 
the longest tenure. TNA (logarithm of total net assets) and fund flows (winsorized at the 1% 
level) are control variables.  
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% levels, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Ri 
-0.3141 
(-0.5) 
-0.3375 
(-0.54) 
0.2398 
(0.37) 
0.4459 
(0.6) 
αit 
-1.3011*** 
(8.9) 
-1.2851*** 
(8.83) 
-0.1068 
(-0.8) 
-0.0681 
(-0.52) 
βm,it 
-4.4415*** 
(-11.65)  
-1.5491*** 
(-3.83)  
σεi 
0.9511 
(0.86)  
0.6116 
(0.53)  
σi  
-0.3094 
(-0.28)  
0.3591 
(0.32) 
αit *Team 
-2.5722*** 
(-20.78) 
-2.2474*** 
(-19.21) 
-3.2651*** 
(-18.61) 
-0.4351 
(-0.31) 
Gender 
-0.7211*** 
(-7.87) 
-0.7601*** 
(-8.27) 
-0.0535 
(-0.48) 
-0.7704*** 
(-7.71) 
αit *Tenureq1 
1.4739*** 
(7.4) 
1.5227*** 
(7.75) 
0.8577*** 
(3.53) 
-0.0565 
(-0.29) 
αit *Tenureq2 
0.2436 
(1.39) 
0.4926 
(1.41) 
-0.6094*** 
(-2.62) 
-1.7326*** 
(-8.54) 
αit *Tenureq3 
-0.0826 
(-0.51) 
0.041 
(0.26) 
-0.4428** 
(-2.09) 
-1.7185*** 
(-9.42) 
αit *Tenureq4 
-0.6448*** 
(-4.09) 
-0.6573*** 
(-4.3) 
-2.1077*** 
(-10.77) 
-3.4372*** 
(-20.14) 
αit *Tenureq5 
-1.9243*** 
(-13.89) 
-2.0323*** 
(-14.91) 
-4.4603*** 
(-23.06) 
-5.5467*** 
(-29.98) 
TNA 
0.0714*** 
(4.79) 
0.0406*** 
(2.74) 
0.1757*** 
(10.1) 
0.238*** 
(14.7) 
Flows 
0.0064 
(0.24) 
0.0069 
(0.26) 
0.0003 
(0.01) 
0.0017 
(0.07) 
Constant 
2.6881*** 
(8.07) 
0.1202 
(0.48) 
0.0355 
(0.11) 
-1.8942*** 
(-7.56) 
Pseudo R2 0.2042 0.1874 0.2589 0.2163 
Observations 3946 3946 3946 3946 
 
In pension funds without manager replacement, managers with longer tenure 
obtain lower excess returns (-0.0001), incoming resources improve excess returns 
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(the flows coefficient is significantly positive in column 6) and the remaining charac-
teristics are not important in predicting excess returns. It is remarkable that the higher 
raw return achieved by experienced managers does not translate into greater excess 
returns. This can be produced when managers who have been working too long 
in a given fund achieve a certain status (lower risk of dismissal) and their efforts are 
not as prolific as at the beginning of their tenure (Porter and Trifts, 1998; Kemft 
et al., 2014). Indeed, Kacperczyk et al. (2014) find that managers of top funds are 
younger and less experienced. With regard to managerial structure, we, like Prather 
and Middleton (2002, 2006), do not find perceptible differences between the excess 
returns of team-managed funds and those managed by individuals. Similarly, as in 
Powell and Ansic (1997), we do not find that gender has an impact on excess returns. 
Pension funds with manager replacement present different results. Before 
replacement (column 9), the team variable is the only significant variable, affecting 
the excess return positively. After replacement, experienced managers obtain lower 
excess returns and funds receiving more inflows achieve greater excess returns (sig-
nificantly positive coefficients in columns 12 and 13). The result for the tenure vari-
able suggests that managers starting in a new fund are motivated to maintain their 
jobs, thus achieving better results, but they become complacent over time.  
The general negative tenure-excess return relation found in Table 3 (except 
in the pre-replacement period) may be explained by agency issues of managers with 
longer tenure, new more motivated managers, and by the fact that manager replace-
ment can also be due to voluntary departure. Kostovetsky (2010) indicates that the best 
managers often leave funds to work for hedge funds, so a negative correlation between 
experience and skill would exist among the remaining managers (Kemft et al., 2014). 
On the other hand, the insignificant results in the pre-replacement period may be 
there because experienced and non-experienced managers have not yet achieved 
a position of rank, so both types of managers endeavor to obtain positive excess 
returns.  
We also note that team-managed funds only obtain better excess returns 
before manager replacement. Examining the number of funds managed by teams, 
we observe more team-managed funds in the post-replacement period, suggesting 
that funds attempt to improve results by replacing single managers with teams, as 
the latter structure displays better results in the pre-replacement period. However, 
new teams do not make a discernible difference, perhaps because of structural prob-
lems or because teams are less likely to achieve extreme performance (Bär et al., 
2011).  
Additionally, pension funds do not consider gender when undertaking manager 
replacement,
9
 though when analyzing all of the funds we find that female manager 
achieve lower excess returns. Finally, flows present a positive relation with excess 
returns after manger replacement and the absence of it before replacement, sug-
gesting that manager replacement can be a tool to attract flows and improve excess 
return. 
9 We include the gender variable, despite the scant observations for this variable, because it reports 
interesting results supporting the prior evidence of poorer results of female managers. Nonetheless, we 
repeat this analysis with the gender variable removed and the results remain the same (these results are 
available upon request; they are not reported here due to space constraints). 
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4.3 Risk and Manager Characteristics 
Chevalier and Ellison (1999a) explain that different risk-taking positions 
originate with different manager behavior. In this section, we analyze the relation 
between manager characteristics and risk (total, systematic and idiosyncratic risk), 
taking into account the existence of manager replacement.  
Table 4 shows the relations between manager characteristics and total risk and 
systematic. With regard to the total risk results, Table 4 shows a positive tenure-risk 
link, i.e. total risk increases with manager tenure, except in funds without manager 
replacement (column 5). This indicates that more experienced managers are more 
likely to be replaced when they take greater risks; however, more experienced managers 
tend to take riskier positions after replacement. On the other hand, managerial struc-
ture and gender do not affect risk. When we analyze all funds (column 2), we find 
that fund size inversely affects risk, which also holds during the post-replacement 
period (column 11), i.e. new managers tend to apply less risky strategies when they 
work in larger funds. With regard to flows, risk decreases when funds receive more 
flows. 
The relation between systematic risk and manager characteristics shows that, 
when all pension funds are taken into consideration (column 3), experienced managers 
take greater systematic risk, which explains the lower excess returns found in Table 3. 
Incoming flows reduce systematic risk (column 4). Alternatively, in funds without 
manager replacement (columns 6 and 7), female managers are risk-averse, while 
smaller funds and those funds receiving more flows take a smaller market risk. This 
is consistent with the higher excess returns found for the funds receiving more flows 
(Table 3). 
The pre-replacement results (columns 9–10) show that team-managed funds 
take a smaller systematic risk, so the higher excess returns obtained by these teams 
are related to a lower systematic risk position. After manager replacement, female 
managers are risk-averse and funds receiving resources take less systematic risk. 
Our results further show different relations between the fund and manager 
characteristics and idiosyncratic risk (these results are available upon request). Spe-
cifically, larger funds and funds receiving more flows develop lower idiosyncratic 
risk. The lower total risk supported by larger pension funds (Table 4, column 2) is 
due to lower idiosyncratic risk (larger funds are more resourceful in eliminating this 
risk). The total risk of funds without manager replacement (Table 4, column 5) is not 
affected by fund size because longer funds take more systematic risks (Table 4, 
columns 6–7) but smaller idiosyncratic risks. Female managers of the funds with- 
out manager replacement develop more idiosyncratic risk, which is offset by lower 
systematic risk, as we observe in the lack of a relation between females and total risk 
(Table 4, column 5).
10 
 
4.4 Event-Study Results: Significance of Abnormal Returns 
In this section, we apply the event-study methodology to analyze the effec-
tiveness of manager replacement. We examine the significance of the abnormal 
10 The inclusion of the gender variable shows the different risk aversion of female managers. Nonetheless, 
we repeat this analysis with the gender variable removed (given the few observations with this charac-
teristic) and the results remain the same (these results are not reported here due to space constraints, but 
are available upon request). 
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returns (excess returns) obtained by the pension funds with manager replacement 
over the period surrounding the manager replacement date (t). First, we test the sig-
nificance of the abnormal returns before the manager-replacement date in order to 
test whether managers act differently before being replaced. Then we test the im-
mediate manager-replacement effect. Finally, we evaluate whether the abnormal 
returns are different from zero during the window period (some time before and after 
the manager-replacement date). The window period analysis captures the funds’ per-
formance during the whole manager-replacement process (pre- and post-replacement). 
The pre-replacement abnormal returns show whether managers adjust their behavior 
until termination because they are aware of the impending event and the post-
replacement abnormal returns show the adaptation period of new managers.  
Table 5 reports the average abnormal return measures (AR and CAR) obtained 
from the CAPM (panels A and B) and four-factor model (panels C and D). In each 
panel, we distinguish between the first and second manager replacements (provided 
that there that two manager replacement have in fact been carried out). The AR 
and CAR measures are obtained individually for each fund and then averaged. All 
measures are reported for a two-year period surrounding the manager-replacement 
date (columns 2–8). Specifically, we include the abnormal returns in the event 
month (t) in column 2 and the abnormal returns obtained three, six and twelve 
months before (columns 3–5) and after (columns 6-8) the manager-replacement 
month. Columns 9–11 show the abnormal returns for six-, twelve- and twenty-four-
month window periods around the change (columns 9–11), i.e. three months before 
and three months after the change (t – 3 to t + 3 months, column 9), six months 
before and after the change (t – 6 to t + 6 months, column 10) and twelve months 
before and after the change (t – 12 to t + 12 months, column 11). The significance 
tests are also included, under the null hypothesis of no event effect. 
The AR analysis (panels A and C) provides no significant abnormal returns 
before or after manager replacement (the test results are statistically zero), showing 
that excess returns are not significantly affected by manager replacement three, six 
or twelve months before or after the replacement date. However, CAR provides some 
significant results (panels B and D). Focusing on the first replacement results, the aver-
age abnormal return is significantly positive three, six and twelve months before 
the first (or unique) replacement, indicating that managers who will be replaced 
endeavor to perform better, even one-year before they are replaced. In the post-
replacement period, new managers are not able to develop significant abnormal 
returns (CAR measures are negative and insignificant). Nonetheless, CAR measures 
are positive in the six- and twelve-month periods surrounding the event (as well as 
in the three-month period in panel D), demonstrating that manager replacement has 
an effect in the medium and long term.  
With regard to the second manager replacement, it is noticeable that funds 
present positive abnormal returns twelve months later, revealing that new managers 
need one year to adapt to the new fund (organization, structure, objectives, etc.). 
The one-year window period (panels B and D) and the six-month window period 
(panel B) display positive excess returns in both panels. Consequently, the second 
manager replacement is more effective than the first and is motivated by, among 
other things, the absence of positive excess returns after the first replacement. 
These results are in line with Khorana (2001), who reports substantial deterioration 
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of returns for outperforming funds in the pre-replacement period, and with Andreu 
et al. (2015), who find that new managers need some time to improve their results 
after a manager replacement in Spanish domestic equity mutual funds. 
5. Conclusions 
This paper aims to reveal the determinants of manager replacement in pension 
funds. We also examine the relation between returns, risk and manager charac-
teristics when a pension fund experiences manager replacement. Finally, by apply 
an event-study methodology, we study the effectiveness of manager replacement, i.e. 
the capacity of new managers to improve fund performance around the replacement 
date. Specifically, we analyze 98 Spanish pension funds investing in European equities 
during the period from January 1999 to August 2014. Our sample contains the manage-
ment history of each fund, which allows us to observe the manager replacements 
experienced by each pension fund over time.  
Our empirical results initially show that manager replacements are not driven 
by raw returns, but are related to poor excess returns and certain manager characteris-
tics. Specifically, funds managed by teams, females and more experienced managers 
have a lower probability of experiencing manager replacement.  
We also find that managers with longer tenure achieve higher raw returns, but 
this does not translate into better excess returns, which turn out to be lower. This 
is apparent especially in funds that do not experience manager replacement and 
the finding is related to higher risk positions, career concerns and the voluntary depar-
ture of managers to better positions. Moreover, managerial structure (team versus 
single manager) and gender have no significant effect on returns. Funds receiving 
more flows achieve greater returns, especially after manager replacement. 
Managers also take different risk positions in funds with and without manager 
replacements. Female managers of funds without replacement take lower systematic 
risk, although this conservative strategy produces higher specific risk. Additionally, 
larger pension funds develop less idiosyncratic risk regardless of manager replace-
ment.  
The event-study analysis displays significant evidence when aggregating results 
(CAR measure). In the first (or unique) fund-manager replacement, we find that 
managers strive to improve results before being replaced and new managers are not 
able to achieve significant excess returns. The second manager replacement is more 
effective and motivated by the absence of significantly positive excess returns after 
the first replacement; however, new managers need one year to adapt and obtain 
positive results.  
In summary, this paper provides useful information for pension fund investors 
about the underlying causes of manager replacement and the consequences for the re-
turns on and risks to their savings. The results show that manager replacement 
in Spanish pension funds is not motivated solely by poor excess returns and is also 
linked to manager characteristics, risk-taking behavior, and the financial restructuring 
process experienced by financial institutions in Spain since 2010. 
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